A Caste of Thousands by Chakrabarty, Dipesh
26 FEATURES
A Caste of
THOUSANDS
Rajiv Gandhi's assassination marks the end of an epoch in 
Indian politics. The postwar creed of secular liberalism is 
threatened by the rise of communalism and caste warfare. 
D ipesh Chakrabarty argues that the conflict goes to the 
heart of conceptions of ethnicity in modern political
culture.
I
ndia will soon have been through 
another round of general elections 
proving that, even if its economy is not 
so well at the moment, its democracy 
remains functional. However, the elections have 
been marked by a bout of violence and aggres­
sion, culminating in the death of prime mini­
sterial aspirant Rajiv Gandhi in May. The basis 
for this violence has been the conflict between 
Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Backward and Scheduled 
castes~all those multiple identities that one as­
sociates with India and that have recently given 
rise to passionate conflicts in the country. It is 
these conflicts and their history, particularly 
those around issues of Hinduism and caste that I 
want to focus on as a key to the spectacular in­
stability which has thrust Indian politics into its 
recent turmoil.
The decision last year of V P Singh's coalition government 
to reserve about 50% of jobs in the public sector for the
lower castes, who comprise 85% of the population, led to 
a series of tragic suicides by upper caste youths in many 
Indian cities and, eventually, to the do w nfil of the govern­
ment. Then came a climactic point in the agitation, fester­
ing since 1984, by some Hindu organisations and political 
parties to rebuild a temple at the holy dty of Ayodhya in 
north India, a temple that they claim was demolished and 
converted into a mosque by the Muslim emperor Babar in 
1528. This temple movement has now become part of an 
attempt to build up a strong, aggressive and militant sense 
of unity and self-respect among the Hindus. The people 
who feel most threatened by this development are the 
Muslims of the subcontinent. The coming years in India 
will see people discuss the question of identity with strong 
and divisive passions. As an Indian character in The 
Satanic Verses says (and 1 imagine here the Indian shaking 
of the head and a heavy upper-class Delhi accent): "Battle 
lines are being drawn in India today, secular versus 
religious, the light versus the dark. Better you choose 
which side you are on."
There are serious problems, as we shall see, with the way 
Rushdie's character frames this question of choice. For 
what we see in India is nothing short of contemporary 
ethnic intolerance or what, in popular parlance, we often
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"The last IS years have seen an explosive combination of democracy and demography."
call racism. There are, of course, particular Indian twists to 
this story, and it is also true that racism, properly speaking, 
has sodal-darwinist connotations and should not be con­
flated with ethnicity. Yet, for my purpose here, the popular 
word racism has the advantage of not making India look 
peculiar, The possibility that the current Indian Hindu- 
Muslim or upper versus lower caste conflicts may be, in a 
significant sense, versions of modem problems of ethnicity 
or race, is seldom entertained in discussions in the Western 
media, both Hinduism and caste being seen, not altogether 
unreasonably, as particular to the subcontinent. Within 
India, too, the same law of oversight rules, for racism is 
thought of as something the white people do to the 
coloured. What Indians do to one another is variously 
described as communalism, regionalism and casteism,but 
never radsm. Yet the similarities between what goes under 
the name of communalism or regionalism in India and 
what is loosely called radsm elsewhere are remarkable'.
In focusing on the theme of ethnic intolerance, I will argue 
that the experiment of nation-making in India has a sig­
nificance that goes far beyond the boundaries of that 
country. For it is a story which tells us how modern 
problems of ethnicity cannot be separated from modem 
means of government and communication. My emphasis,
in other words, will be on the way the development of a 
modem public-political life in India has called into being 
constructions of both Hinduism and caste that do not 
admit of such simple binary distinctions as Salman 
Rushdie's character invokes: secular/religious, 
liberal/fundamentalist, nationalist/communal.
This is not to deny the evidence that exists of religious 
conflicts in India before the Europeans came to the country 
But something has fundamentally changed about both 
Hinduism and caste since British rule and particularly 
since the beginning of the 20th century. If I may put it 
simply by using the example of caste, the change may be 
crudely described as this. Earlier, one probably had two 
kinds of castes. You were one caste when you got married, 
and there was always the question of what caste your 
neighbours thought you were, But now you also have to 
think what caste you are when you apply for a job or when 
you run for a seat in parliament. And your answer to these 
three questions will often not be the same. In other words, 
caste and religion now feature prominently in Indian 
public life. The concepts and institutions that make up the 
public sphere-free press, voluntary associations, avenues 
for free debate and inquiry in the public interest-are 
modem Europeans' intellectual gifts to the people they
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considered less fortunate than themselves and at whose 
doors they arrived as raging, mad imperialists. My point 
is that modem problems of Hinduism and caste are in­
separable from the history of this modem public life in 
India that the British instituted and the nationalists 
preserved in what they thought were the best interests of 
the country.
British rule in India lasted a little short of two hundred 
years. The most far-reaching and fundamental innovation 
that the British introduced to Indian society, in my view, 
was the modem state. One symptom of its modernity was 
that its techniques of government were very closely tied to 
techniques of measurement. From surveys of land and crop 
output to prospecting for minerals, from measuring Indian 
brains (on behalf of the false science of phrenology) to 
measuring Indian bodies, diets and life-expectancies (the 
foundations of physical anthropology and modern 
medicine were laid in India), the British had the length and 
breadth of India, her history, culture and society mapped, 
classified and quantified in detail that was nothing if not 
precise even when it was wrongheaded.
The most dramatic examples of this governmental concern 
with measurement were the decennial Indian censuses, the 
first of which was published in 1872. Since the British did 
not go to India in search of pure knowledge, all these 
studies were produced in the cause and in the process of 
governing India, and it is this pervasive evidence of mar­
riage between government and measurement that 1 take as 
something that belongs to the deep structure of the im­
agination that is invested in modem political orders. 
Without numbers, it would be impossible tp practise 
bureaucratic or instrumental rationality.
It is not that premodem governments had no use for num­
bers (one only has to recall that the word 'census' is of 
Roman origin). But as the history of the discipline of statis­
tics tells us, systematic "collection, classification, and dis­
cussion of facts bearing on the condition of a state or 
community" (to quote The Shorter Oxford Dictionary) is 
something that only modem governments do. Such meas­
urements, one could argue, were central to their idea and 
practice of distributive justice whether in the sphere of 
political representation or that of the economy.
The British, as the representatives and the inheritors of 
European Enlightenment, brought these ideas to India. 
While the British would never take the step (until 1947) of 
granting India full self-government, they were often con­
cerned about being 'fair' to the different competing sec­
tions that, in their view, made up Indian society. And these 
sections the British had defined quite early on in religious 
and caste terms. Categories based on caste and religion 
dominated the censuses that the British undertook in India. 
At every census, people were asked to state their religion 
and caste. This was in marked contrast to what the British 
did at home where religion was never an important 
category in the British censuses for the period 1801 to 1931. 
Counting Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Untouchables, 
however, became a critical political exercise particularly in 
the 20th century as the British began to include Indian 
representatives in the legislative bodies in very measured
doses. What made the census operations critical was that 
the British, in trying to be fair referees, made the process of 
political representation 'communal': seats in the legislative 
assemblies were earmarked for different 'communities' 
(defined by religious/caste categories) in proportion to 
their share of property and population.
Nationalists like Nehru and Gandhi abhorred this process 
and the ideology that governed it, 'communalism'-a word 
that still leads a stigmatised existence in India and works 
as a surrogate for 'racism'. Political leaders of the Muslims 
and the Untouchables, on the other hand, felt much hap­
pier going along with the British-devised arrangements 
until the final decade before Independence when negotia­
tions between Indian leaders became as important as those 
between them and the British. Of particular importance in 
the Indian story is the category 'Scheduled caste', which 
the British created (and the government of India has 
retained) in 1936 and which was so called because it 
referred to a schedule of castes officially recognised as 
disadvantaged. Being on this list made these castes eligible 
for special treatment in respect of political representation 
under the Government of India Act of 1935. Other kinds of 
affirmative action were to be undertaken in favour of these 
groups in the future.
Observers of modem India agree that these processes 
created new definitions of collective identities in the public 
and political spheres. In their everyday lives, in the sphere 
of what we would now call the personal, Indians, like 
human beings everywhere, live with senses of identity that 
are highly situational. Yet the very existence of administra­
tive categories of ethnicity-whether one is looking at the 
inter-national level or at developments within a country- 
creates a public sphere for 'ethnicity' (a 'national' identity 
being its highest form). It is, of course, within this sphere 
that the identity of being Indian or Hindu or Muslim or 
Scheduled caste takes on a new political meaning which 
resides alongside, and interlaced with, the more everyday 
sense of community.
The censuses and other similar reports then reconstituted 
the meaning of 'communit/ or 'ethnicity' and gave In­
dians three important political messages, all of which are 
entirely commensurate with the idea of liberal political 
democracy. These messages were:
* that communities could be enumerated and in numbers 
lay one's political clout
* that the social and economic progress of a community was 
a measurable entity, measured in the case of Indian cen­
suses by their share in public life (education, professions, 
employment and so on), and
* that this enabled governments and communities to devise 
objective tests for the relative 'backwardness' or otherwise 
of a community.
Indians were quick to learn the art of participation in this 
public sphere. They learnt-as we all do when we want to 
take advantage of equal opportunity legislation-that 
modem governments have rather limited intelligence; that
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their principles of distributive justice require simple, 
homogeneous, all or none identities, the kinds that 
passports bear. When we look back now at India in the 
1870s and 1880s, it becomes clear that the era of modem, 
competitive, govemmentally defined ethnic identities 
familiar to us in liberal democracies, had already arrived.
The peculiarity of colonial Indian history lay in the fact that 
these identities were based on religious categories because 
of, as I have said, a certain degree of reification of these 
categories by the British. By the 1890s, Hindu and Muslim 
leaders were quoting census figures at each other to prove 
whether or not they had received their legitimate share of 
benefits from British rule (such as employment and educa­
tion). The rise of modem caste consciousness shows a 
similar concern for the measurement of 'progress' in public 
life. The famous anti-Brahman 'manifesto', produced in 
Madras in 1916 by the non-Brahman castes who formed a 
new political party, owed its rhetorical force to social 
categories and statistics the government had used in its 
internal deliberations. Demography was now pressed into 
the service of such newly-redefined ethnic jealousies and 
competition.
But if India was simply a place where ethnicity was con­
tained within the liberal structure of competitive 
pluralism, it would not have made news and this article
would not have been needed, as our contemporary 
Australian experience of ethnicity would have been quite 
adequate as a guide to understanding Indian develop­
ments. Ethnic strife in India, however, has spilled blood in 
large amounts at different points in her history from the 
1890s onward. Recent problems in Assam, Punjab, and 
Kashmir have been particularly glaring. What then is the 
difference, say, between our experience of ethnicity here in 
the 1980s and 90s, and what is happening in India?
The important difference, it seems to me, is largely this. 
Modern ethnic consciousnesses in India have been 
fashioned under historical circumstances where people 
have been under intense pressure to pursue and emphasise 
their differences from one another. The important point is 
that the question of Indian political unity has never been 
settled beyond all doubt and disputation. The British cob­
bled a political India together for reasons of administrative 
convenience. The nationality question was muddled from 
the beginning. In the public sphere that the British created, 
there was no one, universally agreed-upon 'Indian' eth­
nicity. The struggle to produce a sense of cultural unity 
against the British made mainstream Indian nationalism 
culturally Hindu. The Muslim search for Pakistan em­
phasised Islam. The lower castes' struggle for justice 
produced anti-Brahmanism.
The last 15 or 20 years have seen an explosive combination 
of democracy and demography. The population of India 
has almost trebled since Independence. The growth and 
diversity of the middle class may be judged from the fact 
that while at Independence there was consensus that the 
number of important languages was 14, there are now 
daily newspapers published in more than 78 different 
languages. This middle class has tasted consumerism 
which has increased the sense of competition in urban life. 
The secessionist aspirations in Kashmir, Punjab and parts 
of Assam have gained in strength in recent years. Caste, 
particularly the Indian policy of positive discrimination in 
favour of the lower castes, has become an extremely con­
tentious issue in public life (in the context of both a slug­
gish economy and an ever-widening awareness of their 
'legal rights' on the part of the lower castes). And lately 
there has been the movement, led by the Vjshwa Hindu 
Parishad (a modem Hindu political organisation), for the 
restoration of the temple on the place where the legendary 
god-king Rama was supposed to have been bom, the 
Ramjanmabhumi. This agitation which aims to convert 
Hinduism into a strong, monolithic and militant religion 
has given many Indian Muslims understandable 
nightmares.
Fundamentally, like the Soviet Union, India remains in 
part an imperial structure held together by strong tenden­
cies towards centralism. Unlike theSovietUnion, however, 
these centralist tendencies exist within, and have to work 
through, a democratic political structure. Indians have an 
investment in democracy which was proved in the un­
popularity of Mrs Gandhi's two-year emergency of 1975- 
77. Indian democracy thus holds together a system that 
can survive as a unity only if it has a strong centralising 
and unifying ideology as well. And this is where there ha ve 
been some very significant changes.
The question o f Indian  
po litica l unity has never 
been settled beyond  a ll 
d o u b t"
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Once this centralising tendency was most powerfully rep­
resented by the ideology of Jawaharlal Nehru and stood 
for some kind of consensus among the political elite. This 
ideology, known in India by the name of secularism, drew 
heavily on the Western liberal heritage to argue for a 
separation of religion and public life. This tenet never 
described the actual culture of political practice in India 
where a religious idiom and imagination had always been 
very strongly present. But so long as the national leader­
ship lay in the hands of a tiny elite reared in and respectful 
of the British traditions of politics, the everyday religious­
ness of Indian political culture could be kept separate from 
the decision-making elite at the highest levels of the 
government. The custodian nature of this elite was 
reflected in the unity of the Congress party where Nehru 
always remained a Bonapartist figure.
The combination of demography, democracy and 
economic growth in India has now ensured that the politi­
cal elite is no longer tiny. There are no Bonapartist figures 
in India today. Nehruvian secularism, a dose cousin of 
Western liberalism represented now by marxists and the 
left-liberals in India, is on the defensive (recall Salman 
Rushdie's character talking about the battle lines), and for 
some very profound reasons.
Liberal political structures and institutions in the West are 
supported by certain tenets of individualism that pervade 
both private and public spheres of life. Most Indians grow 
up in entirely different family and sodal structures and 
while they are perfectly comfortable with the idea of 
Westem-style technology and creature comforts, the 
prospect of adopting post-industrial family relationships 
does not gladden their hearts. Students of political sotiol- 
ogy have demonstrated time and again that the cultural 
dynamics of Indian institutions are quite different from 
those that one might find in the West. The sophistication 
of Indian culture ties in very different directions.
This is where I locate the current conundrum of Indian 
political culture. On the one hand there exists a structure 
of pluralist and democratic political representation which, 
as history has shown, is valued by the Indian ruling classes. 
On the other hand, a centralising tendency constantly as­
se ts  itself on the political scene precisely because the 
question of Indian unity has not yet been settled. The 
political geography of India keeps evolving. This is the 
context in which the new political Hinduism has assumed 
importance. What gives the Hinduists' message urgency 
now is the freedom movement among the Muslims in 
Kashmir. The avowedly Hindu parties make hatred of 
Muslims the focus of Hindu/Indian unity.
What are the prospects and problems of this new attempt 
to define Indianness with a consdous Hindu content?
First of all, its strengths. A most important source of 
strength of this movement is its capadty to speak with 
many different voices. Its leaders at the parliamentary level 
sometimes speak the prose of pure liberalism. We are all 
equally Indians, they say, then why should the Muslims 
receive any spedal treatment as a constitutionally-recog­
nised 'minority community'? At the grassroots level, how­
ever,the mobilisation of support is achieved by preaching 
hatred toward the Muslims. The internally diversified 
rhetoric of this movement points to the many different 
constituendes that it is seeking to capture.
Its weakness lies in the fact that Hinduism does not lend 
itself very easily to the manufacture of a monolithic version 
of it. The Hinduism that the Hindu parties try to project 
have so far reflected a predominantly upper-caste, Brah­
man! cal imagination. It is difficult to see how the lower 
caste people could welcome this Hinduism or wholehear­
tedly identify with i t  Pushing the cause of the so-called 
scheduled and backward castes, however, could cost this 
movement the support of the upper-castes on which it has 
until now depended. This may in part explain why the 
movement is mainly confined to certain regions of north 
India; the ruling Hinduism of south India has for long been 
anti-Brahmanical. As far as I can see, the neo-Hindus have 
not yet succeeded in bridging this caste divide.
One ironical aspect of this movement derives from the 
global context in which this attempt develop 'one 
Hinduism' is being made. The Indian diaspora to the 
developed countries-the highly skilled professional In­
dians who have always constituted a large part of the 
international market in 'brains' since World War Two-has 
increasingly become an important source of financial and 
moral support for this neo-Hindu, semi-fascist movement 
in India. The irony is that an important section of this 
emigr6 community—the Indians who now live in the 
United States-successfully lobbied in the recent past to get 
themselves classified as a special ethnic community in 
order to qualify better for the benefits that flow from the 
American equal opportunity legislation. Yet the question 
of giving 'minority' communities back home some of the 
same privileges seems to cause a lot of political heartburn 
among their leaders in India.
India is no doubt at an interesting point in her history. It is 
unlikely that monolithic Hinduism will emerge victorious 
through the democratic process, though its pull will 
remain an important factor. Nor is there any evidence that 
economic growth by itself will necessarily revive and 
spread the spirit of Nehruvian secularism. Some Indian 
intellectuals wistfully look to the memory of Gandhi in 
search of a non-modem/non-Westem model of political 
order. But Gandhi in some respects was a very special case 
made possible by the operation of colonialism. Most 
powerful Ind ians, as an American journalist once said, find 
Gandhi 'inspiring and irrelevant'. International develop­
ments, on the other hand, particularly those in the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia, must affect the way the nationality 
question will be discussed in India in the coming few years. 
Can there be a recognisably Indian variety of ethnic or 
religious tolerance in the public sphere now that is, at the 
same time, in harmony with other institutions in the 
country? The future will tell but that question defines for 
me the challenge of the historical juncture at which India 
now finds herself.
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